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lV 
·IN THE SUPREME COURT 
1
0F THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRASHER :MOTOR AND 
FINANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
I 11,601 
RICHARD A. BRO,i\TN and J AC-
QUELINE A. BRO,i\TN, partners dba 
B & C COl\lP ANY, a partnership, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEl\lENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit for replevin of certain motor 
1 
vehicles held by defendants on trust receipts; defend-
ants filed a counterclaim, the exact nature and grounds 
of which was never quite clear to the plaintiff. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court on its own motion dismissed the complaint 
and counterclaim for failure of both parties to prose. · 
cute the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks to have the order of the . 
court affirmed. · 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth by the defendants.' 
appellant.s as relates to the sequence of filings of plead-
ings and motions in this matter are essentially correct, 1 
except that the file and record before this Court does 
not contain the Notice of Readiness for Trial allegedly 
filed by the defendants. 
The Sheriff's Return on the Writ of Replevin 
made July 25, 1963 showed that he was unable to locate 
any of the property sought by the Writ (R. 6). Hence,• 
for all practical purposes plaintiff then lost interest in 1 
its Complaint. Almost one month later, on August 21, 1 
1963, defendants filed their counterclaim (R. 9-10). 
Plaintiff immediately, on August 29, 1963, filed a Mo· 
tion to Strike the Counterclaim (R. 20) and there the 
matter stood dormant until January 13, 1969 when : 
defendants served on plaintiff a Notice of Readiness 
for Trial, although the record fails to disclose tha't such 
2 
Notice was actually filed with the Court. Plaintiff im-
mediately, on January 20, 1969, filed its Objections 
to such Notice of Readiness (R. 22). Defendants did 
not even then move to call up such objections or the 
previous Motions of plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an 
Amended Motion to Strike the Counterclaim ( R. 25-
30) and called the same up for hearing on March 14, 
1969. (R. 27). It was at that hearing that the Court 
on its own Motion dismissed the Complaint and the 
Counterclaim. Hence, the statement of defendants-
appellants in their Statement of Facts that each party 
was proceeding at the time of dismissal to a determina-
l!on of the issues of the merits is not true, inasmuch as 
the case, and particularly the Counterclaim, was never 
at issue and the defendants were donig nothing to get 
it at issue. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS PO,VER ON 
ITS O'\TN MOTION TO DISMISS BOTH COM-
PLAINTS AND COUNTERCLAil\IS F 0 R 
LACK OF PROSECUTION. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO NEED FOR A PARTY TO 
SHO,i\T PREJUDICE ON HIS PART BEFORE 
3 
HE MAY MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL FOR 
WANT OF PROSECUTION. 
POINT III 
A DECISION OF A LOWER COURT DIS-
MISSING AN ACTION, FOR WANT OF DUE 
DILIGENCE IN PROSECUTION, MAY NOT 
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS 
THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION BY THE COURT. 
POINT IV 
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND 
1 
COUNTERCLAIM, THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS POWER ON '. 
ITS OWN MOTION TO DISMISS BOTH COM· 
PLAINTS AND COUNTERCLAIMS F 0 R 
LACK OF PROSECUTION. 
Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ' 
deals with involuntary dismissals and provides in per· 
tinent part that: 
4 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
comply with these rules or any order of court, 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or any claim against him .... Unless the court 
in its order for dismisal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdiYisio11 and any dismis-
sal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for a lack of jurisdiction or for im-
proper venue or for lack of an indispensible 
party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits." 
Rule 41 ( c) then goes on to provide : "The provisions 
of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third party claim." Quite clearly, those 
rules permit a defendant to move for dismissal of a 
plaintiff's complaint for lack of prosecution and permit 
a plaintiff to move for dismissal of a defendant's counter-
claim for the same reason. However, in the light of the 
above-stated rule, may a court dismiss a complaint or 
counterclaim of its own motion? The answer is clearly 
yes. 
It is generally held that courts inherently have 
the power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. 
This power is in addition to the expressed statutory 
procedure for dismissal. The general rule is stated in 
27 C.J.S. Dismissal & Nonsuit §65 at 233 as follows: 
"While statutes or rules of court providing 
for the dismissal of actions for want of prosecu-
tion have been adopted in a number of jurisdic-
tions, such statutes or rules must be read in the 
light of the existence of such inherent power, 
which remains unimpaired unless it is limited 
5 
expressly or by necessary implication. Thus it 
has been held that the affirmative expression of 
the statutes providing for dismissal does not 
deprive the court of its inherent powers." 
This proposition is amply supported by case law. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Idaho in interpreting 
Rule 41 ( b) of their Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
is almost word for word the same as our Rule 41 (b), 
said: 
"A trial court has the power to dismiss a case 
because of failure to prosecute with due diJi. 
gence; such power is inherent and independent 
of any statute or rule of court .... Rule 41 (b) 
'did not take away or limit this power but recog- .' 
nized and incorporated it in a code of civil pro-
cedure.' " Beckman v. Beckman, 88 Idaho 522, 
401 P.2d 810, 812 ( 1965). 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Nevada in . 
Harris v. Harris, 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402 ( 1948), 
discussed the inherent power of the court to dismiss 1 
for want of prosecution in affirming a lower court's 
dismissal of a cross-complaint. The court said: 
"Likewise, a court of record has inherent , 
power to dismiss a cross-complaint for lack of 
1 
diligence in its prosecution. [Citing cases.) 
This inherent discretionary power which a 
court of record possessed remains unimpaired 
unless it is expressly limited by statute." 196 1 
P.2d at 404. 
6 
The Supreme Court of Oregon has clearly stated the 
rule in Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., 221 Ore. 
328,351P.2d80 (1960), as follows: 
"Yirtually all courts rule that they have in-
herent power to dismiss cases if failure to prose-
g cute with due diligence is established." 351 P.2d 
h at 83. 
I, 
'·' 
It is also clear that as part of this inherent power 
to dismiss every court has, in the absence of direct 
regulation by statute, the power to dismiss an action 
of it own motion without the necessity of either party 
moving for dismissal. .For example, in City of Wichita 
t'. Katino, 175 Kan. 657, 265 P.2d 849 (1954), a de-
' J· fendant in a criminal prosecution appealed from a 
2, police court to the district court. The district court 
1 <lismissed on its own motion for lack of prosecution. 
in The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and the 
), Supreme Court affirmed. In so doing, the court recog-
ss 
1 
nized the general rule that: "The power of a court to 
's dismiss a case, upon its own motion, because of failure 
to prosecute with due diligence is inherent and exists 
independently of any statute." 265 P.2d at 850. Simi-
larly, the Supureme Court of Wyoming has held in 
· Moshannon Nat'l. Bank v. Iron Mountain Ranch Co., 
"Tyo. 265, 18 P.2d 623, rehearing denied, 21 P.2d 
a (1933), that courts have the inherent power to 
dismiss of their own motion for want of prosecution. )6 
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also so held in 
Reed v. First N at'l Bank of Gardner, 194 Ore. 45, 241 
P.2d 109 ( 1952). In affirming a lower court's dismissal 
7 
for want of prosecution, the court characterized the 
two ways of proceeding to dismiss as follows: 
"In dismissing an action for want of prosecu-
tion, the court may proceed under the statute 
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that 
end. In acting on its own motion, the court must 
proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest 
in the records that the court's discretion has 
been abused." 241 P.2d at 115. 
A recent Arizona decision has also recognized thi5 
power. In Cooper v. Odom, 6 Ariz. App. 466, 433 P.2d 
646 ( 1967) , the Arizona court made the following : 
comment in affirming the lower court's exercise of dis-
cretion in dismissing an action for want of prosecution: 
"Trial courts have the inherent power to dis- 1 
miss a case on their own motion if the case has · 
not been diligently prosecuted. [Citing cases.] 
In this respect the exercise by the trial court will 
not be appeal in the absence of an 
1 abuse of discretion. 433 P.2d at 646. · 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has also recognized 
the inherent power in the court in the decision of Balar 
v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d 195 (1964). The trial 1 
court had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on its own : 
motion, and the plaintiff appealed. In upholding the 
trial court's decision in dismissing the action, the Su-
preme Court said: 
"'Ve have many times held that the district 
court has inherent power to dismiss a case for 
failure to prosecute, independent of statute, and 
8 
unless there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
trial court's dismissal will not be disturbed on 
appeal." 
Not only are state court cases unanimous in their 
recognition of the inherent power of a court to dismiss 
of its own motion for want of prosecution, but federal 
cases interpreting Rule 41 ( b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure have also consistently held that that 
rule in no way impairs the inherent power of the court. 
These federal cases take on some added importance 
when it is recognized that the Utah rules are patterned 
, after the federal rules and Utah has recognized the 
' 
1 persuasiveness of federal precedent in interpreting 
those rules. In W ynerger v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 
487, 252 P .2d 205 ( 1953) , the court said with respect 
• I to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"Since these rules were fashioned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper 
that we examine decisions under the Federal 
Rules to determine the meanings thereof." 
:d ' In reviewing the federal decisions, it has been observed 
· in 5 Moore's Federal Practice, ,41.11[2} at 1115: 
al I 
rn i "Rule 41 (b) clearly places dismissal for fail-
be ure to prosecute in the district court's discretion. 
u· 'Vhile Rule 41 (b) provides that 'a defendant 
may move' for dismissal for want of purosecu-
tion, a district court may-either under Rule 
ict 1 83 or the exercise of its inherent power to keep 
!or its docket clear-disµiiss of its own motion for 
nd want of prosecution .... " 
9 
Perhaps the leading federal case in this area, and the 
one that encompasses the principles of the federal rule 
is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 8 L.Ed. 
2d 734 ( 1962) , in which the Supreme Court held that 
a district court had the inherent power to dismiss on 
its own motion an action for want of diligent prosecu-
tion. The court there stated: 
"The authority of a federal trial court to dis-
miss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because 
of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be 
doubted. The power to invoke this sanction is 
necessary in order to prevent undue delays in . 
the disposition of pending cases and to avoid , 
congestion in the calendars of the District Courts. ' 
The power is of ancient origin, having its roots 
in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur : 
entered at common law, e.g., 3 Blackstone, Corn· 
mentaries ( 1768), 295-296, and dismissals for . 
want of prosecution of bills in equity, e.g., id., 
at 451. It has been expressly recognized in Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 41 (b) ... " · 
"Petitioner contends that the language of this ' 
Rule, by negative implication, prohibits involun· 
tary dismissals for failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute except upon motion by the defendant. · 
In the present case there was no such motion." 
"We do not read Rule 41 (b) as implying any 
such restriction. Neither the permissive Ian· 
guage of the Rule-which merely authorized a 
motion by the defendant-nor its policy requires ,· 
us to conclude that it was the purpose of the Rule · 
to abrogate the power of courts, acting on their 
own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases 
10 
that have remained dormant because of the in-
action or dilatoriness of the parties seeking re-
lief. The authority of a court to dismiss sua 
sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been 
considered an 'inherent power', governed not 
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily 
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so 
as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dispo-
sition of cases." 
* * * 
"Accordingly, when circumstances make such 
action appropriate, a District Court may dismiss 
a complaint for failure to prosecute even without 
affording notice of its intention to do so or pro-
viding an adversary hearing before acting." 
In contrast to the vast source of precedent touched 
on above, appellants claim that the district court has 
no power either by statute or inherently to dismiss both 
the complaint and counterclaim of its own motion for 
, want of prosecution and cite in support thereof a rule 
of civil procedure which has no application to this 
situation and a Utah Supreme Court decision which 
is totally irrelevant. Appellants cite and use exten-
sively Rule 41 (a) which involves voluntary dismissal 
of actions and Watson v. White, .... Utah .... , .... P.2d 
.... ,June 18, 1969, which interprets that rule. 
Rule 41 (a) provides that a plaintiff may not 
t'olnntarily move to have his own action dismissed un-
less a counterclaim filed by the defendant may stand 
, independently. Quite obviously, the purpose of the rule 
is to prevent a plaintiff from dismissing and putting 
out of court a defendant, who may have a perfectly 
11 
valid cause of action on a counterclaim, by voluntarily 
dismissing his own action. That rule clearly has 0;1 
application to a dismissal for want of diligence in prose-
cuting an action. In this case plaintiff made no motion 
to voluntarily dismi.ss his action. The dismissal resulted 
from action taken by the court, of its own motion, to 
dismiss both the plaintiff's complaint and the counter. 
claim for want of due diligence in prosecution. All the 
plaintiff did was fail to object to the court's dismissal 
of its complaint and joined with the court in its motion 
to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for want of 
prosecution. With this background, the decision of 
Watson v. White becomes quite irrelevant. In that . 
decision, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the entire action, ' 
both his complaint and the counterclaim. The motion 
to dismiss the complaint was based upon Rule 41 (a) 1 
and the motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim 
was based upon laches, the plaintiff claiming that the 
defendant was barred as a matter of law from prosecut. 
ing his counterclaim because of his laches in failing · 
to file said counterclaim until almost six years after the : 
filing of the complaint. The court ruled that plaintiff's . 
motion to dismiss the counterclaim was not timely. 
Initially the court noted that under Rule 41 (a) , once ' 
defendant's counterclaim is filed plaintiff may not vol-
untarily dismiss his claim unless the counterclaim may 
stand independently of the complaint. Since this Court 
did not reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing · 
the complaint, the court must have found that the · 
counterclaim could exist independently of the com· 
12 
plaint . The court then went on to correctly point out 
that the only way a counterclaim could be dismissed 
under a Rule 41 (a) voluntary dismissal motion was 
by agreement of the defendant. With reference to the 
question of defendant's !aches, the court held that the 
trial court was without discretion to rule upon that 
issue until the propriety of a voluntary dismissal under 
Rule 41 (a) was determined. That decision clearly has 
no application to a dismissal by the court of the de-
fendant's counterclaim for want of prosecution under 
Rules 41 (b) and (c) and through the court's inherent 
power. This motion to dismiss in the White case could 
not possibly have been construed as a Rule 41 (b) mo-
tion since it was made almost immediately after the 
defendant's counterclaim had been filed. The holding 
in that case is totally inapplicable to any question in-
volved in this appeal. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO NEED FOR A PARTY TO 
SHOW PREJUDICE ON HIS PART BEFORE 
HE MAY MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL FOR 
WANT OF PROSECUTION. 
Although some cases have appeared in talk in 
terms of the necessity of showing prejudice or injury 
before a party may move for a nonsuit or dismissal, 
it is generally held that such injury or prejudice may 
be presumed by the court from a long delay. The gen-
eral rule has been stated as follows: 
13 
"While it has been held that the defendant in 
order to be entitled to a nonsuit or a dismissal 
must as well as la.ck of due diligence 
on plamhff s part, the law will presume injurl' 
from the unreasonable delay." 27 C.J .S. Dismis·. 
sal & Nonsuit §65 ( 2) at 440. 
In affirming a lower court's decision dismissing au 
action for want of prosecution, the Supreme Court of 
Montana in interpreting Rule 41 (b) of their Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a rule which is patterned after the 
Federal rule and very similar to the Utah rule, said 
with reference to the question of prejudice: 
"Plaintiff argues that the action could not be , 
dismissed as defendant has shown no injury by 1; 
the delay. When a plaintiff has slept on his cause 
for over 12 years the law presumes injury and . 
places the burden on the plaintiff to show good i 
cause for the delay." Creemer v. Braaten, 438 ! 
P.2d 553, 554 (Mont. 1968). 
California also has recognized this general rule when \ 
I 
in the decision of Welden v. Davis Auto Exchange, 315 i 
P .2d 33 (Cal. 1957), the court said: 
"Appellant contends the trial judge ought not · 
to have granted the motion for there was no I 
affirmative showing that respondent was preju· , 
diced by the delay. In Gray v. T!Jnes-Mirror 
Co., 11 Cal. App. 155, at pages 163-164, 
P. 281, at page 484 we find: 'We do not under· 
stand it to be necessary for the party moving to,! 
dismiss for want of diligence in prosecuting an 1 
action to affirmatively show the extent of the 
inconvenience or injury he has suffered, or may · 
14 
suffer by reason of the delay. The law will pre-
sume injury from unreasonable delay.' " 315 
P.2d at 36-37. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that in exer-
cising its discretion, the trial court may consider the 
existence of prejudice in deciding whether or not to 
dismiss. An understanding of this principle explains 
the decisions cited by the appellants in their brief 
which on the surface appear to hold that showing of 
prejudice is necessary. In the decision of Wright v. 
Howe, 46 Utah 488, 150 P. 956 (1915), a decision 
rendered some 20 years prior to the adoption of our 
present rules of procedure, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a lower court's refusal to dismiss for lack of 
I · diligence. In so doing, the court observed that the 
l defendant in making his motion to dismiss had failed 
to show that he had been prejudiced in any way by 
the delay. Likewise, in Lyon v. State, 76 Idaho 37 4, 
283 P.2d 1105, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld 
a lower court's decision refusing to dismiss for want 
of due diligence when the defendant had failed to show 
\ any prejudice. Neither court affirmatively held that 
ot '. a showing of prejudice is a prerequisite to dismissal. 
10 ! All these cases in fact held is that the lower court did 
u· 1 not abuse their discretion in failing to dismiss where or 
04 no prejudice was demonstrated. It is suggested that the 
:r· 
1 
appellate court in each case was merely permitting the 
to,! tr!al court to consider prejudice as one of the factors 
an : upon which it could base its decision. [he :I 
1ay • 
15 
This has been suggested in 2B Barron and Holt. 
zoff's Federal Practice and Procedure, §918 at 143-144. 
"It has been said on the one hand that dis-
missal will not be ordered unless there has been 
prejudice to the defendant, and on the other 
hand, that if the delay is unreasonable, preju-
dice will be presumed. Probably the sound 
answer is that the defendant need not show 
prejudice, but that the court will consider tlk 
prejudice, if any, to the defendant, in determin-
ing whether to excuse plaintiff's failure." 
That statement is amply supported by citation of fed· 
eral cases in the footnotes. State courts have also come 
to this same conclusion in interpreting their state rules 
of procedure. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska in Silverton v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3 (1964), said 
in upholding the lower court's dismissal of an action 
for want of diligence: 
"The court below had sufficient reason to dis· 
miss the action for failure to prosecute. It was 
not necessary, as appellant contends, for ap· 
pellees to show prejudice by reason of delay in 
service before dismissal would be justified. The 
operative condition of Civil Rule 41 (b) is lack 
of reasonable diligence on the part of the appel· 
lant and not a showing by appellees that they 
would be prejudiced if the action were not dis· 
missed. Prejudice or lack of it is a factor 
may be considered by the court in the case o! 
moderate excusable neglect. But here the neg· 
lect on the appellant's part was neither moderate 
nor excusable." 389 P.2d at 6. 
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The Supreme Court of Oregon has also quite clearly 
pointed out that prejudice is a factor to be considered, 
though it is not a necessary prerequisite to a dismissal 
for lack of prosecution. In Horn v. California-Oregon 
Power Co., supra, the court made the following obser-
ration in discussing the factors going into showing a 
lack of due diligence: 
"Justice should be administered with reason-
able promptness and any action upon the part 
of the suitor which is at variance with that ob-
jective must be given consideration whether the 
procrastination is of long duration or short. The 
issue of diligence generally cannot be determined 
by doing nothing more than counting the days 
that have passed. Illness, the absence of a wit-
ness, prejudice to the defendant, the impending 
decision of a similar case in another court and 
other similar factors must generally be con-
sidered in addition to the length of delay in 
resolving the issues of due diligence." 351 P.2d 
at 84. 
; ! 
1 However, the court went on to indicate quite clearly 
1 '. that prejudice is not a necessary prerequisite to the 
finding of lack of due diligence : 
•I 
"Even though the defendants did not accom-
1 . pany their motion which sought dismissal with a 
showing of prejudice, such a showing was not 
essential." 351 P.2d at 84. 
f I 
·• ! The court then pointed out that when the delay is 
e of an excesively long period of time, the court may 
presume that injury has occurred and the burden of 
17 
showing justification for the delay is then placed upon 
the claimant. 
"["\V]hen the plaintiff came to the hearing of 
March 4, 1958, she knew that she was confronted 
with the duty of explaining her long delay. She 
also knew that the court would presume that 
her dilatory course had injured the defendant." 
351 P.2d at 84. 
POINT III 
A DECISION OF A LOWER COURT DIS-. 
I 
MISSING AN ACTION, FOR WANT OF DUE 
DILIGENCE IN PROSECUTION, MAY NOT I 
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS 1 
THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF 1 
DISCRETION BY THE COURT. 
In some strange way, the appellant to intimate 
that the district court has no discretion in dismissing 
I 
I 
a complaint or counterclaim for want or lack of prose- '1 
cution. However, there is nothing either in the cnse: 
law or in the rule which would support such a i 
conclusion. Rule 41 (b) which deals with dismissal ol i 
actions for want of prosecution does not spell out the 1' 
grounds upon which such a dismissal may be made or , 
, I 
the factors to be taken into consideration by the court. 
Quite obviously, the rule leaves the dismissal within, 
the court's discretion to be determined upon the facts 
1
1 
and circumstances involved in each case. If the courts I 
did no't have discretion, they would be effectively pre· J 
eluded from ever dismissing an action for want of '· 
18 
prosecution under the present structure of Rule 41 (b) 
since there is no definition of the phrase "failure to 
prosecute." Appellant apparently bases his claim that 
the court lacks discretion upon his misunderstanding 
of Rule 41 (a). It is true that with reference to a vol-
imtary dismissal, the court does not have discretion 
to grant the voluntary motion of the plaintiff to dis-
miss the entire action if a counterclaim has been filed 
and the counterclaim may not exist independently of 
the complaint. However, as noted above, this rule has 
1 
no application whatsoever to the present situation. 
The cases cited above under Point I clearly dem-
1 onstrate that the courts have recognized that a dismissal 
1 
for lack of prosecution is within the discretion of the 
trial court. Those cases also indicate that once that 
discretion has been exercised by the trial court, the 
decision may not be overturned on appeal unless a clear 
abuse of discretion may be demonstrated. A few addi-
tional citations might be helpful in further tying down 
this principle. In Creemer v. Braaten, supra, the Su-
preme Court of Montana phrased it this way: 
"It is within the discretion of the trial court 
to dismiss an action if it has not been prosecuted 
with reasonable diligence. It is presumed that 
the trial court acted correctly and its decision 
will not be overturned without a showing of 
an abuse of discretion." 438 P.2d at 554. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in interpreting their Rule 
H(b) in the decision of Beckman v. Beckman, supra, 
1 stated the rule as follows: 
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"The trial court's order or judgment dismiss. 
ing an action for lack of prosecution will be re. 
versed only for an abuse of discretion. (Citing 
cases.} 'Ve are constrained to view that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion." 401 P.2d at 
812. 
In Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., supra, the 
court required the following kind of demonstration of 
abuse of discretion before it would overturn the lower . 
court's decision: 
"['V}hen a case has been long neglected and I 
no adequate excuse is offered for the neglect, '. 
an inference arises that the case lacks merit. i 
Under those circumstances an affidavit or some- :. 
thing of a similar nature should be offered sho1\'- 1 
ing that the case actually possesses merit. Noth. · 
ing of that kind is on file in the case. A party : 
whose case is dismissed in the circuit [trial] court ' 
for lack of prosecution and who asks an appellate I 
court to reverse the circuit court's order should 
see to it that the record contains something sub-; 
stantial which will justify the appellate court's I 
reversing." 351 P.2d at 85. ! 
I 
The federal case law has been summarized in 5 Moore's'. 
Federal Practice, ,41.11 [2} at 1125, as follows: I 
i 
"Since the order of dismissal for failure to 
prosecute is discretionary, it will not be , 




IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND 
COUNTERCLAIM, THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
There is ample evidence contained in the record 
on appeal that the defendants-appellants are truly 
guilty of a failure to prosecute and nothing to indicate 
otherwise. Initially, it is clear that the burden of pro-
ceeding forward with the case is upon the claimant. 
Under normal circumstances, the adverse party has no 
affirmative duty to move the case forward but needs 
only to def end against the claim and take whatever 
steps are necessary in effecting that defense. The Su-
preme Court of Colorado in interpreting their Rule 
4I(b) in Koon v. Bar'mettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 
713 ( 1956) , stated the rule as follows: 
"The burden rests upon plaintiff and not upon 
defendant, to prosecute a case in due course and 
without unusual delay." 
That this is also true with reference to the prosecution 
of a counterclaim is demonstrated by the of 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Pettine v. Rog-
ers, 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638 (1958). The plaintiff 
moved to have defendant's counterclaim dismissed under 
Rule 41 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 
for want of prosecution. In affirming the trial court's 
dismissal, the Supreme Court said: 
"The duty rests upon the claimant in every 
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stage of the proceeding to use diligence to e . 
pedite his case." 321 P.2d at 640. x 
It should be obvious from the record in this actiun 
that the defendant has not carried its burden in pro. 
ceeding forward with the case. The record on appeal 
which is the certified file of the district court indicates 
that the Notice of Readiness of Trial prepared by thr 
defendant which brought this action to a head was in 
fact never filed. As a result, no official action was taken 
by the defendant on his counterclaim for approximately 
51/2 As it turns out, the only action taken ;, 
that period of time was taken by the planitiff. Defend-
ant's delay has been excessive; it is suggesetd that under, 
the cases cited above, the delay is of a long enougn ' 
duration to enable the court to assume prejudice on 
the part of the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant: 
has been in a position during this entire period to! 
serve process on and bring into the action the other i 
parties which defendant alleged were in conspiriM:y : 
with Brasher .Motor Company and as a result shoula i 
be parties to the action. However, no such action wa1 ! 
taken. The case are quite clear that a failure to serve [ 
a party which should be and is a part of the action when· 
I 
that party has been available for service clearly demon·' 
strates a lack of due diligence. See, e.g., Beenally r 
Pigman, 78 N.M. 189, 429 P.2d 648 (1967); Silverto11 
v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1964). 
Defendants have attempted to show justificatio1, 1 
by claiming that the action was, at the time of the dis· 1 
missal, being actively prosecuted. They argue that: 
22 
regardless of the prior delays, now that the action is 
being prosecuted it may not be dismissed. The whole 
basis of defendants' counterclaim relates to matters 
which defendants allege plaintiff did in concert with 
others whom defendants' counterclaim states would 
later be joined as third-party defendants. Nothing was 
done by defendants under Rule 14 (a) or otherwise to 
join such third parties and the statutes of limitations 
obviously would bar any such actions against such pro-
posed third parties at this late date. How can defendants 
therefore claim that they either diligently, seriously, 
or at all pursued their counterclaim? The record is 
1 
absolutely void of any evidence that the defendants 
' were actively prosecuting their counterclaim. The 
only basis upon which they may make such a claim 
is the preparation of a Notice of Readiness for Trial. 
! However, even if defendants had or did file such a 
notice, it alone would not be sufficient to show an active 
prosecution of the case. The Supreme Court of Oregon 
I in Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., supra, indi-
cated that a mere filing of a Motion for Continuance 
was not sufficient to show an active prosecution of the 




, I ,., 
"The mere fact that a plaintiff who is accused 
of inexcusable delay files a motion for a con-
tinuance-such as the plaintiff in the case at bar 
filed-cannot be viewed as an automatic release 
from the predicament created by the delay for 
if the plaintiff could escape that easily from the 
exigency into which his slothful ways cast him, 
0.R.S. 18.260 and the inherent power of the 
23 
court to dismiss inactive cases would be stripp rl 
of their potency." 351 P.2d at 85. e 
It would appear that much of the language of the . 0 
Oregon court could be applicable to the filing of a 
Notice of Readiness for Trial. A filing of such a 
motion does certainly not, in and of itself, indicate that s 
the party so filing has been actively prosecuting the 
case. This is especially true with reference to 
action where it is obvious that even if such a notice · 
had been filed, the defendant was not prepared to• 
proceed on his counterclaim, since he had never in-: 
eluded as parties to the action those he claimed were : 
in conspiracy with Brasher Motor and Finance Com- i 
pany, and furthermore, the case was not even at issue, ' 
since plaintiff's Motion to strike the counterclaim fileu 
51/2 years before, had never been called up by defend· · 
ants or disposed of in any way. In addition, even a! 
cursory reading of the counterclaim demonstrates that I 
I 
substantial discovery work would be necessary to proye : 
the allegations contained therein. No discovery work 
of the nature required by the counterclaim has been 
performed. In filing the Notice of Readiness, defend· 
ants-appellants had to know that the representatiom 
1 
therein were not true because the state of the recora; 
showed plainly that the case was not at issue. The i 
filing of the Notice of Readiness for Trial appears to 
1 
have been merely a stalling tactic in hopes of putting i 
pressure on the plaintiff to make some kind of offer 1 
of settlement. The California courts have recognizea i 
that an attempt to get a trial date was not sufficient 
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to demonstrate that the plaintiff in fact had been 
actively prosecuting the case. In Atkinson v. County 
of Los .Angeles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 467, 4 Cal. Rptr. 423 
( l960), the lower court an action for want 
of prosecution. In affirming that decision, the court 
said: 
"The sole issue on this appeal is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing 
'the action. The discretion was that of the trial 
court and the exercise thereof will not be dis-
turbed except in cases of manifest abuse. [Citing 
cases. J The trial court was bound to consider 
whether the plaintiff had had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to bring the action to trial and had dis-
charged the duty imposed upon every person 
who filed an action to prosecute it with reason-
able promptness and diligence. [Citing cases.] 
The fact that the motion for dismissal was made 
after a date for trial had been set pursuant to 
the request filed on September 5, 1957, did not 
in and of itself preclude the granting of the 
motion." 4 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
It is obvious that something more than a mere filing 
of a Notice of Readiness for Trial must be done to 
demonstrate that the defendants were actively prose-
cuting their claim. 
As an excuse for the lack of diligence in prosecut-
ing his claim and apparently as a justification for a 
finding of abuse of discretion upon the part of the 
lower court, the defendants claim that the delay was 
due in part to the fault of the plaintiff, and in so doing 
cite the decision of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Rob-
25 
bins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624. The defendants tii 
claim that that case stands for the proposition that & 
whenever either party may bring the action to trial or si 
to a conclusion, a granting of a motion to dismiss for 
111 
lack of prosecution is improper. However, if such were si 
the holding of that case, it would totally abrogate the si 
operation of Rule 41 ( b), and no motion to dismiss for . F 
lack of prosecution could ever be granted, since botn , ol 
parties to an action are always free to file a Notice · m 
of Readiness for Trial, or to call up pending motiom. ei 
A close reading of the Crystal Lime & Cement Co. case 
1 
clearly demonstrates that the holding of the court ii 1 
not nearly so broad, and is predicated entirely upon 
1
• tc 
the factual situation in that case. In that case, the plain ' 11' 
tiff's complaint and the def endanfs counter-claim haa 01 
been fully tried. The court had rendered a decision : er 
in part for the plaintiff on his complaint and also in i p: 
part for the defendant on his counterclaim. However, ' p: 
neither party filed findings of fact and conclusions ol ! bi 
law and no judgment of the court was ever entered. fe 
Some 8 years later, the lower court granted defend· w 
ant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The tl 
Supreme Court reversed holding that since both the! w 
defendant and plaintiff had received partial judgment. ti 
either could have brought the case to conclusion · II' 
by submitting the proper findings of fact and conclu-'. 
sions of law. As a result, this court said a motion to l b 
dismiss made by either party was improper since botn ,· ti 
\ 
parties were equally at fault in failing to bring the! tl 
matter to a conclusion. This decision is clearly di1· i d 
26 
1 
tinguishable from the instant case. In the Crystal Lirne 
& Cement case both parties equally shared the respon-
r sibility to file the proper papers with the court. It was 
r uot 11 case of equal opportunity, but of equal respon-
t sibility. In the present action, plaintiff has no respon-
sibility to prosecute the defendants' case for them. 
r Furthermore, in the Crystal case, there was no question 
1 , of prejudice by reason of testimony or evidence becom-
e • ing stale or unavailable, because the testimony and 
'· evidence had all theretofore been presented. 
. . The plaintiff herein readily admits that it has 
1
• totally abandoned its complaint and has no intention 
111 
. ': whatsoever of pressing that action. The Sheriff's Return 
l on the l\T rit of Replevin showed that none of the prop-
n 
1 
erty sought by plaintiff could be found ( R. 6) . The 
n · plaintiff made no objection to the court's dismissal with 
• Ii prejudice of its complaint. In effect, the plaintiff 
,; 
1 
became a defendant in the action initiated by the de-
1. fendants in their counterclaim. The burden therefore 
[. was no longer upon the plaintiff to move forward with 
1 the case but was upon the defendants to move forward 
11
• with the case with their counterclaim. We submit that 
t. I the holding in the Crystal Lirne & Cement case is in no 
r · way pertinent to the matter here before the court. 
J· No fault upon the part of the plaintiff can be shown 
\ by the record. There is no evidence of settlement nego-
\ liations which might justify the long delay. Nor is 
it i there any evidence that the plaintiff instigated the 






the failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear in court nor 
otherwise. The record does not disclose evidence that 
the plaintiff has acquiesced in the defendants' delav , 
or has given them permission either by agreement o.r 
stipulation of counsel to delay the proceedings. As a 1' 
result, the defendants have totally failed to show anv 
justification for their failure to actively and diligent];. I 
prosecute their counterclaim and to bring it to a con. , 
clusion. As a result of this and the failure to show anv l 
abuse of di.scretion on the lower court's part 
face of the extended length of time which this action 
has lain dormant, the relief sought by defendants on 
appeal should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
'Ve respectfully submit that the trial court haa 
the power on its own motion to dismiss both the com· 
plaint and the counterclaim for lack of prosecution;\ 
that no abuse of discretion has been or could be shown 
on the part of the court; and, that the judgment ol 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, 'VATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
ZARE. HAYES 
GLEN E. DAVIES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
28 
